By Beau Hodai
November 18, 2013
DBA Press and the Center for Media and Democracy (DBA/CMD) release records obtained from the Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A) pertaining to the operations of the Domestic Security Alliance Council (DSAC). These records were recently obtained through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request originally filed with DHS I&A in August, 2012.
Among other things, these records disclose DHS I&A/DSAC private sector intelligence sharing concerning Wikileaks (a journalistic outfit) and ‘hacktivist’ group Anonymous; Booz Allen Hamilton work on behalf of DHS I&A/DSAC; and aspects of private sector involvement (corporations such as Merck & Co.) in the workings of the U.S. intelligence community.
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DSAC background
As previously reported by DBA/CMD (“Dissent or Terror: How the Nation’s Counter Terrorism Apparatus, in Partnership with Corporate America, Turned on Occupy Wall Street,” May 20, 2013), DSAC is a public-private intelligence sharing partnership between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DHS I&A and several of the nation’s leading corporate/financial interests– most of which are Fortune 100 corporations.
Some of these DSAC-member corporate/financial interests comprise the DSAC Leadership Board. The DSAC Leadership Board consists of 29 corporations and banks. Corporate/financial interests active in the DSAC Leadership Board include/have included: Bank of America, MasterCard, Citigroup, American Express, Barclays, RBS Citizens, 3M, Archer Daniels Midland, ConocoPhillips, Time Warner and Wal-Mart.
Along with DSAC chairpersons from the FBI and U.S. DHS I&A, DSAC is co-administered by a representative of these private sector interests (the chairman of the DSAC Leadership Board). During the time period covered by available records (2011 and 2012), pharmaceutical giant Merck & Co. Vice President of Global Security Grant Ashley served as the DSAC Leadership Board Chairman.
It is worth noting that a number of corporations active in the DSAC Leadership Board also took part, along with several other banks and corporations, in the Department of Homeland Security Private Sector Information-Sharing Working Group. This working group, consisting of 79 representatives from 51 Fortune 500 corporations, was instrumental in drafting (through collaboration with DHS I&A, the U.S. DHS Private Sector Office and the U.S. DHS National Programs and Protection Directorate office of Infrastructure Protection– “DHS IP”) the “DHS Private Sector Information-Sharing Working Plan,” which– predictably enough– called for the dedication of further resources to public-private intelligence sharing partnerships, largely through the national network of state/regional “fusion centers” (for more on this, see “Dissent or Terror”).
Such corporate/financial interests partnered in this “working group” include Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Business Executives for National Security, ASIS International, National Defense Industrial Association, Xcel Energy, Colonial Pipeline Company, Boeing, Microsoft, Motorola, Oracle Corporation and Google.
[Note: Business Executives for National Security (BENS), is a private organization that purports to work with U.S. DHS, the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and other agencies in the protection of “national security.” The BENS Board of Directors consists of executives from a number of real estate firms, legal firms, defense contractors, and various financial/corporate interests. Some notable BENS Board of Directors members include executives with military/intelligence/law enforcement contractor Booz Allen Hamilton, Quaker Chemical Corporation, Janus Capital Group and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.]
What follows are some of the key points of interest contained in the recent release of DSAC records obtained from DHS I&A:
Domestic public-private intelligence partnership, co-chaired by career CIA officer, focuses on Wikileaks and Anonymous
Records contain a January 21, 2011 email string that details aspects of a public-private intelligence/situational awareness briefing concerning Wikileaks (a journalistic entity) and ‘hacktivist’ group Anonymous.
Before we get into the details of this email string, it is worth noting– as a point of context– that the only other definite groups/individuals of DSAC interest identified in these available records are al’ Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, “jihadists,” and “violent extremist” groups. This context may provide some insight into how DHS I&A, the FBI and their corporate partners, view Wikileaks and Anonymous (and it is worth noting that, in at least one instance contained in these records, the Occupy Wall Street movement was the subject of a DSAC briefing).
Due to heavy redactions/withholdings inflicted on available records by DHS and the FBI, it is not known what agency or entity initiated this briefing, though one version of the email subject line that was not as heavily redacted as other iterations reads: “FW: Call from former [REDACTED] re Wikileaks and Anonymous.” In all other iterations of this subject line, the word “former” is also redacted.
This January 21, 2011 email string included DHS I&A Deputy Under Secretary for Analysis (DHS’ DSAC chairperson) Dawn Scalici, DHS I&A Deputy Under Secretary for Enterprise and Mission Support Michael Potts, and other individuals whose names have been redacted by DHS.
As stated by unknown individuals (apparently employed by DHS I&A, though their names and any other identifying information has been redacted) in this email string (entitled “Re: Call from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] re Wikileaks and Anonymous,” page 21, DSAC First Release):
“Additionally, we learned that HITRAC briefed all impacted Sector Specific Agencies (SSAs), providing them with situational awareness, and requested that they voice concerns from their perspective. The SSAs from the Defense Industrial Base and Telecommunications Sectors had concerns and briefed their cleared private sector partners. [REDACTED] was the POC [Point of Contact] at HITRAC.”
HITRAC (Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center) is a joint operation between DHS IP and DHS I&A, tasked with providing threat and risk (such as natural disasters and hostile human action) assessments to DHS personnel and DHS “partners.”
The January 21, 2011 Wikileaks/Anonymous email string also contains an interesting exchange between Scalici and Potts, in which Scalici asks Potts if he has “any information/advice to offer.” In response, Potts wrote:
“As we discussed, if there are analytic resources that can be applied to review the data, at a minimum for some of the key private sector companies or concerns, [REDACTED to end of email]”
Given the fact that DHS redacted the remainder of this email, and given the fact that further communications regarding this briefing are conspicuously absent from materials delivered to DBA/CMD, it is unclear what “analytic resources” or “data” Potts referenced pertaining to Wikileaks and/or Anonymous.
The redaction of the remainder of the text in the Potts “analytic resources”/”data” email was claimed under FOIA exemption 5 (Title 5 U.S.C., sec. 552 (b) (5)). This, and other (b) (5) redactions, were rationalized in a September 9, 2013 DHS I&A letter accompanying this first incremental release of records, as such:
“FOIA Exemption 5 protects from disclosure those inter- or intra-agency documents that are normally privileged in the civil discovery context. After carefully reviewing the responsive documents, I determined that certain portions of the responsive documents qualify for protection under the Deliberative Process Privilege to protect the integrity of the deliberative or decision-making process withing DHS,” wrote DHS I&A FOIA Officer Priscilla Waters. “The release of this internal information would discourage the expression of candid opinions and inhibit the free and frank exchange of information among agency personnel.”
Furthermore, the remainder of available records are heavily redacted, largely citing FOIA exemption 6 (Title 5 U.S.C., sec. 552 (b) (6)). Such redactions include the names– as well as any other identifying information– of persons, entities, and, in at least one case, places (the word “Japan” was redacted in at least one instance contained in these records, wherein DSAC private sector personnel discussed the impact the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster had on their respective businesses. Similarly, speaking to possibly improper uses of this exemption, the words “Occupy movement” were redacted under (b) (6) in a report that appears to have been drafted by Booz Allen Hamilton personnel employed at DHS I&A/DSAC). As such, the identity of the individual/entity (as well as the word “former” in proximity to that identifying information) who had briefed DSAC members concerning Wikileaks and Anonymous was redacted under 5 U.S.C., sec. 552 (b) (6).
As stated in the September 9, 2013 Waters FOIA letter:
“FOIA Exemption 6 exempts from disclosure personnel or medical files and similar files the release of which would cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. This requires a balancing of the public’s right to disclosure against the individual’s right privacy [sic]. The information being withheld pursuant to this exemption consists of the identities of and identifying information about lower-level DHS personnel as well as private citizens whose privacy interests outweigh the public interest in this information.”
Before we move on, one more point on how this definition of FOIA exemption 6 was applied to DSAC records obtained by DBA/CMD: in records detailing intelligence/security conferences/symposiums held for the benefit of corporate security personnel working in concert with the FBI and DHS, DHS I&A regularly– almost without exception– utilized FOIA exemption 6 (meant to be used to protect the personal privacy of individuals in instances where there is no substantive public interest in disclosure– i.e. “personnel or medical files and similar files the release of which would cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”) to conceal the names of corporations engaged in DSAC. For example, on March 18, 2011 a DSAC Corporate Security Symposium hosted by Merck and the Merck Global Security Group (led by DSAC Leadership Board Chair and Merck Vice President of Global Security Grant Ashley) was held at the Merck corporate headquarters in Whitehouse Station, New Jersey. Almost all available records are scrubbed– using FOIA exemption 6– of any information that would identify Merck’s role in this DSAC activity, even though DSAC’s own website clearly states Merck & Co.’s involvement, and leadership role, in DSAC. Fortunately for those seeking to make sense of these records, DHS I&A missed an identifying reference to Merck contained in (ironically enough) a confidentiality statement attached to a Merck email. Similarly, it is only through such isolated lapses of the black marker that certain work products and communications contained in these records can be identified as having originated with Booz Allen Hamilton.
But we’re getting off topic here. Back to Wikileaks and Anonymous. While, according to DHS I&A, we are not free to know either who initiated the briefing concerning Wikileaks and Anonymous, or what “analytic resources” were applied to what “data” pertaining to Wikileaks and Anonymous, we can look a little more deeply into the context of this January 21, 2011 conversation by looking more deeply into one of the conversants: DHS I&A Deputy Under Secretary for Analysis, and DSAC DHS I&A Chair, Dawn Scalici.
Scalici has spent roughly three decades of her life in service of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). And, while the CIA is not supposed to engage in any operations on U.S. soil, DHS I&A– and their DSAC partner agency, the FBI– certainly are.
During a December 4, 2012 House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence hearing regarding “terrorist exploitation of refugee programs,” subcommittee chair Rep. Patrick Meehan (R-PA), in his introduction of DHS I&A Deputy Under Secretary for Analysis Scalici, stated:
“Prior to joining DHS, Ms. Scalici served as the director for production and strategic program at the CIA’S Office of Iraq Analysis where she oversaw current and strategic analysis in Iraq and led efforts to advance planning, analytic tradecraft, and community collaboration. She earlier served as the deputy director for mission management at the National Counterterrorism Center, helping oversee National intelligence related to the counterterrorism mission. Ms. Scalici is a 29-year veteran of the CIA.”
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), an entity of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), is the nation’s leading “counter terrorism” intelligence sharing partnership. Both NCTC and ODNI were created through the massive intelligence restructuring/”information sharing environment” construction efforts enacted through the “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004″ (IRTPA).
IRTPA, essentially an omnibus “intelligence community” restructuring bill affecting a broad array of domestic intelligence functions, established the cabinet-level Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Office of the National Director of Intelligence. As laid out in IRTPA, the DNI “[serves] as head of the intelligence community.” This “community” consists of 16 agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, the Drug Enforcement Administration and numerous military intelligence agencies. As such, IRTPA designated the DNI as the chief “national security” intelligence advisor to the president, the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council. The DNI, per IRTPA, is also tasked with providing such intelligence to heads of federal executive branch agencies, the U.S. Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
NCTC is comprised of staff from partner intelligence agencies. Such agencies include: CIA, FBI (the FBI’s National Joint Terrorism Task Force is situated within NCTC), DoD intelligence entities, and DHS.
According to a John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) biography of Scalici, prepared per Scalici’s role as a panelist at the 2008 “Unrestricted Warfare Symposium” (sponsored by JHU/APL and the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies), Scalici served as a “career CIA officer […] on assignment to NCTC and its predecessor organization, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, since 2003.”
It is worth noting as well, by way of illustrating Scalici’s rank within the CIA, that, according to the JHU/APL Unrestricted Warfare bio, Scalici also served as the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI, head of CIA) at the National Security Council.
And, according to former DHS I&A analyst-cum-whistleblower Daryl Johnson, just as Scalici was a CIA officer assigned to NCTC, Scalici remained in the employ of CIA while serving as DHS I&A Deputy Under Secretary for Analysis. As reported by Johnson in his book, “Right-Wing Resurgence: How a Domestic Terrorist Threat is Being Ignored” (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, September, 2012), detailing alleged deliberate DHS I&A ignorance of American right-wing hate groups, Scalici acted as a CIA manager on-loan during her time at DHS I&A:
“[DHS I&A Principal Deputy Under Secretary] Bart Johnson selected a well-seasoned CIA manager named Dawn Scalici […] Scalici, however, was not a permanent employee of I&A. She remained a CIA official on a two-year assignment to I&A.”
Indeed, while the DHS public affairs office has not responded to requests for information pertaining to Scalici’s term of employment at DHS I&A, DHS I&A FOIA Officer Waters has indicated that Scalici departed DHS I&A at some point in 2012. Waters advised that further information pertaining to Scalici’s employment/terms of employment may only be sought through further FOIA requests.
But Scalici was not the sole CIA alumni at work in DHS I&A at the time of the creation of DSAC records obtained by DBA/CMD.
According to a speaker biography issued per a November, 2009 New Mexico Border Security and Intelligence Conference, co-sponsored by the New Mexico Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management and the Rocky Mountain Information Network, then-DHS I&A Associate Deputy Under Secretary for Analysis Melissa Smislova had been employed by both the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in the years immediately prior to her work at DHS.
According to U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs transcripts for the confirmation hearing of Caryn Wagner as DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis (held December 3, 2009), Wagner also was employed by both DIA, ODNI and CIA prior to her nomination at DHS I&A. It is also worth noting that Wagner is a former Booz Allen Hamilton employee.
FBI refuses delivery of further Anonymous records
In response to a DBA/CMD FOIA request seeking further FBI records pertaining to Anonymous, submitted to the FBI subsequent to the release of the above-detailed DHS I&A DSAC records, the FBI responded, on November 7, 2013:
“Please be advised that it is the FBI’s policy to neither confirm nor deny the existence of any records which would tend to indicate or reveal whether an individual or organization is of investigatory interest to the FBI. Acknowledging the FBI’s interest invites the risk of circumvention of federal law enforcement efforts. Thus, pursuant to FOIA exemption (b) (7) (E) [5 U.S.C. sec. 552 (b) (7) (E)], the FBI neither confirms nor denies the existence of records which would indicate whether an individual or organization is or ever has been of investigatory interest.”
For what it’s worth: aside from the fact that the January 21, 2011 DSAC email string shows definite FBI/DHS I&A/corporate interest in Anonymous, records obtained by DBA/CMD (pursuant to a FOIA seeking records relating to the Occupy Wall Street movement) from the FBI in November of 2012 are replete with references to Anonymous, “actors sympathetic” with Anonymous, and ‘hacktivists.’ Furthermore, records obtained by DBA/CMD throughout 2012 from law enforcement entities active in “fusion centers” contain multiple examples of further FBI interest in Anonymous and ‘hacktivists.’
Booz Allen Hamilton Work in Support of DHS I&A/DSAC
According to records, private military/intelligence contractor Booz Allen Hamilton has been employed by the Department of Homeland Security in a supportive role of DHS I&A. According to records, such Booz Allen Hamilton personnel working in support of DHS I&A were detailed to work with FBI, DHS and private sector members in the administration of DSAC.
Available records suggest that Booz Allen Hamilton’s work “in support” of DSAC has ranged from involvement in coordinating day to day operations of the public-private intelligence partnership (per DSAC issue updates contained in available records), to work in support of the development of DSAC standard operating procedures, private sector “customer service” and website technical support, in coordination with FBI personnel.
Records also contain an internal DSAC “update,” that appears to have been drafted by Booz Allen Hamilton personnel (name redacted by DHS), dated October 13, 2011, which states that individuals/entities (names redacted by DHS) drafted an “assessment of the Occupy movement’s activities at the request of several member companies.”
Booz Allen Hamilton received nationwide attention in June of 2013 through the leaking of National Security Agency (NSA) information detailing NSA global intelligence gathering/surveillance programs, including the agency’s acquisition of massive amounts of cell phone metadata, as well as an NSA intelligence gathering/surveillance program known as Prism, which apparently relies on unfettered agency access to the servers of corporations such as Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, Apple, Facebook, Twitter, Skype and others.
The disclosure of the cell phone metadata and Prism programs occurred through a leak of NSA documents to The Guardian. The leak was executed by a former CIA analyst and Booz Allen Hamilton employee who had been assigned to the NSA, Edward Snowden. Further Snowden disclosures have included revelations of U.S. spying on diplomats and heads of state, as well as revelations detailing further wholesale NSA gathering of internet/communications data globally.
In response to a DBA/CMD FOIA request seeking further Booz Allen Hamilton FBI work products, submitted to the FBI subsequent to the release of the above-detailed DHS I&A DSAC records, the FBI responded– in their all-to-typical cryptic, non-sequitur fashion– on October 22, 2013:
“The FOIA does not require federal agencies to answer inquiries, create records, conduct research, or draw conclusions concerning queried data. Rather the FOIA requires agencies to provide access to reasonably described, nonexempt records. The questions posed in the referenced letter [this is a reference to the DBA/CMD FOIA request seeking FBI Booz Allen Hamilton work product– which was not a letter, and which did not pose any questions] are not FOIA requests because they do not comply with the FOIA and its regulations.”
Further notes on FOIA requests, redactions and withholdings
On August 1, 2012, DBA/CMD submitted FOIA requests to both the FBI and DHS seeking records pertaining to DSAC, in the possession of agency employees assigned to DSAC.
The FBI request sought such records from then-FBI Director Robert Mueller, FBI DSAC Program Director Arnold Bell, DSAC Deputy Program Director Andrew Lim, and DSAC FBI Chairperson/FBI Assistant Director Ronald Ruecker.
Outside of a perfunctory acknowledgement of the FOIA request’s receipt, received by DBA/CMD on August 1, 2012, the FBI has not responded in any way to this request– whether through the production of responsive records, or through a FOIA request denial.
The August 1, 2012 DHS request sought DSAC materials in the possession of Scalici, DHS I&A DSAC Deputy Program Director Larry Jaski, Jr., and the office of then-DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano (the Napolitano records were processed as a separate request and delivered to DBA/CMD in early 2013).
Initially, DHS rejected this DSAC FOIA on the grounds that insufficient query material had been provided. Upon inspection and discussion with DHS FOIA Officer Maura Busch, it became clear that someone in the DHS FOIA office had altered the FOIA from its original form, as submitted by DBA/CMD, by removing most of the search criteria (the FOIA request had been altered to seek “any and all communications (emails, faxes, memos, letters, etc.) in possession of the offices (including office personnel) of DHS Deputy Undersecretary/DSAC Chairperson Dawn Scalici,” [sic]). Once this situation had been rectified, on August 22, 2012, DHS FOIA Officer Tony Tucker resubmitted the request to DHS I&A for processing.
On May 22, 2013, DHS I&A FOIA Officer Priscilla Waters advised DBA/CMD that the I&A DSAC request had yielded more than 4,000 pages of responsive records. Responsive records, according to Waters, included email communications generated/received by Scalici pertaining to the operations of DSAC, as well as email communications between DSAC private sector liaison Jaski and DSAC corporate members. Furthermore, Waters advised that the DSAC charter, as well as materials pertaining to the drafting of the DSAC charter, were present in responsive records sets– though some of the “deliberative” materials pertaining to the creation of the charter would likely be withheld/redacted. As such, a tentative plan to release responsive records in 500 page increments, to begin in June, was agreed upon.
Rather than produce any records in June, DHS I&A FOIA Officer Waters contacted DBA/CMD on July 10 and stated that 173 pages– out of 4,000– had been referred to the FBI for further clearance/redaction.
When asked why records were being delivered to the FBI for further clearance/redaction, as these records were responsive to a FOIA request submitted to DHS I&A– and not to the FBI, which had yet to respond to their own August 1, 2012 DSAC FOIA– Waters stated that the DSAC charter requires all FOIA materials pertaining to DSAC to be cleared through the FBI, as the FBI is the lead DSAC agency.
As DBA/CMD had already been advised that the DSAC charter was part of the 4,000 pages of documentation responsive to the DHS I&A DSAC FOIA, DBA/CMD asked that DHS I&A produce the DSAC charter in order to provide some legal basis for their claim that all responsive records must be cleared through the FBI. In response, DHS I&A FOIA Office Waters refused to provide DBA/CMD with a copy of the charter, stating that the FBI would have to release the charter to DBA/CMD.
On September 9, 2013, DHS I&A delivered the first incremental release of records responsive to the August 1, 2012 DHS DSAC FOIA request. This consisted of 33 pages of heavily redacted emails.
On September 11, 2013, DHS I&A delivered the second incremental release of records responsive to the August 1, 2012 DHS DSAC FOIA request. This consisted of 92 pages of heavily redacted emails.
On September 30, 2012, DHS I&A delivered the final set of records responsive to the August 1, 2012 DHS DSAC FOIA request. This release consisted of three files, constituting an 92-page records set identical to the second incremental release.
This third “release” was accompanied by a letter from Waters, stating that the third records set completed DHS I&A processing of the August 1, 2012 DHS DSAC request. No further records would be forthcoming from DHS I&A.
As stated in the September 30, 2013 letter:
“[…] On July 10, I&A notified you that 173 jointly produced pages were referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for their review.
“A search of I&A for documents responsive to your request produced a final total of 171 pages. Of those pages, I have determined that 92 pages are partially releasable, pursuant to Title 5 U.S.C. [sec.] 552 (b)(5), (b)(6) and (b)(7)(e). The remaining 79 pages are being referred to the FBI for review and final response to you. Please note that a tremendous number of the original 4,000 file total were not releasable because they were either non-responsive or outside the scope of your request, or duplications.”
In actuality, after more than a year of processing time, DHS I&A produced 125 heavily redacted pages of records responsive to the August 1, 2012 DSAC request (and some of that number are duplicates)– this out of the more than 4,000 pages initially identified.
Further records, including, according to Waters, materials delivered to DSAC private sector corporate members by DSAC private sector liaison Jaski– as well as the DSAC charter that DHS I&A and the FBI claim serves as a legal basis for FBI’s dominion over this FOIA request– have not been produced by the FBI, nor has FBI responded to inquiries regarding these materials. Needless to say, the FBI does not return our phone calls.